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I. INTRODUCTION
Coalitions aggregate, catalyze, mediate, and forward interests.
Like neurons in a neural net, coalitions are both junctures of
communications and information processors, and through their
interactions, connections, and field effects, they become nodes of influence
and decision.
In bodies politic, coalitions play key roles in public policy
negotiations and in organizational and corporate decision making.
Alliances, groups, and federations, from informal to official and from
spontaneous to planned, all engage in political and quasi-political
negotiations in legislative politics at all levels. Coalitions clash, contend,
and compete in the fields that regulatory boards and administrative
agencies oversee and referee. Internationally, coalitions of nations, and
coalitions of groups within and across nations, shape and determine the
* Gary Goodpaster is a Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
1. Although coalitions are extremely important actors in many negotiations, there is not a
lot of writing about coalitions in the dispute resolution literature. Game theorists, social
psychologists, and political scientists have produced significant work on the theory of
coalitions and coalition formation. Because it is theoretically oriented, much of the literature
is concerned primarily with the question of what a rational actor would do in acting to form,
and to divide the gains of, a winning coalition in highly constrained and competitive
circumstances. This literature provides useful insights about what constitutes rational
behavior under limited assumptions or in experimental game conditions. Without attempting
to provide a review of this complex literature, I have selectively used some of its insights to
suggest some of the complex dynamics that go into coalition formation.
In the dispute resolution literature, some works on mediation and public policy
dispute resolution treat coalitions as bargaining actors, but do not detail coalition dynamics.
C. SUSAN L. CARENTER & WJ.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBIC DISPUTES (1988);
CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); LAWRENCE SUSSIIND &
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING
PUBLIC DIsPUTES (1987).
Aside from the foregoing, the works I found most indispensable in helping
understand coalitions were: SAMUEL B. BACHRACH & EDWARD J. LAWLER, POWER AND
POLITICS IN ORGANIZATIONS (1980); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION (1982); David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, Thinking Coalitionally: Party
Arithmetic, Process Opportunism, and Strategic Sequencing, in NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 153
(H. Payton Young ed., 1991). The last cited work is particularly valuable, and anyone
interested in the subject should consult it. See also JAMES K. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE
LAW OF THE SEA (1984).
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terms of major multi-national treaties, such as the Law of the Sea Treaty2
and GAT. 3  Coalitions also mold and influence decisions in other
domains of international action. These grand joint exertions include: 1)
the recent efforts to end the Serbian-Bosnian-Croation crisis;4 2) the
pursuits of private international corporations seeking business, government
contrcts, or favors abroad; 3) the humanitarian labors of non-profit
international relief agencies; and 4) the struggles of nongovernmental
organizations to influence the handiwork of nations. Within more private
realms, coalitions sway and often control the internal and external
decisions of a myriad of corporate bodies from boards of directors and
faculties to corporate committees, task forces, and working groups, or
gangs.
Coalitions penetrate and infiltrate all collective decision making,
and anyone whose work engages the decision making of groups must
understand how coalitions may affect group processes and decisions. In
particular, negotiators, mediators, and consensus-seeking facilitators
involved in multi-party negotiations - "focal negotiators" for ease of
reference - must understand coalition formation and the nature and
dynamics of coalition bargaining. Alliances and alliance activity affect
both how decisions are made and what decisions are made. Alliances may
both enable and disable effective and efficient bargaining. Alliances may
facilitate agreements or preclude them. Alliances and coalitions, however,
are neither fixed nor permanent, nor relentless entities. One can work
with coalitions both to shape and to reform them to effect desired decisions
and agreements.
Understanding coalitions and coalition bargaining dynamics
endows the focal negotiator with the cognitive schemata to form, track,
and reconfigure coalition paths and plays. Knowing these coalition
dynamics, however, is not quite enough. For example, in many arenas
and negotiations in which coalitions are active, the allies who form
coalitions are themselves aggregates, sometimes even collectivities of
collectives. They comprise large groups that are only represented in
coalitions. Those seated at the coalition table speak for others: groups,
organizations, constituencies, and groups of organizations and
constituencies. Acting as an agent for others entails role-directed and
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122
(1982), reprinted In 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); cf. JAMES K. SEBENIUS, supra note 1.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 55 U.N.T.S.
187.
4. William E. Schmidt, Croats and Muslins Reach Truce to End the Other Bosnia
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at Al.
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constrained behaviors and consequently creates dynamics different from
those occasioned by acting on one's own behalf. When some or all parties
at the table represent groups or constituencies, and table coalitions and
countercoalitions form, the negotiating game can become quite complex.
The complexity will increase when there is coalition play within the
represented parties. Coalitions away from the bargaining table will affect
coalitions and their agents at the table. Therefore, in their cognitive
blueprint, focal negotiators should trace not only the circuitry of coalitions,
but also the connected circuitry of the agencies involved in bargaining.
IH. COALIONS
Increasing the number of parties involved or interested in a
negotiation can seriously complicate it. Adding parties can lead to the
addition of issues and to the need for increased communication and
coordination. As a result, the possibilities of conflict multiply and may
create new constraints on settlement. Bringing in parties may also alter
the power relationships in a negotiation and change its bargaining
dynamics. All of these effects may occur where negotiating parties create
alliances or coalitions, either to achieve negotiation goals or to block those
of some other party.
A. Coalitions
A coalition is an alliance of two or more parties agreeing to
engage in joint or coordinated action against other parties or coalitions.s
Coalitions form when parties perceive that allied action is the best way for
them to gain or maximize desired outcomes. Allying forces to enhance
the power of coalition members constitutes a problem-solving response to
competitive situations in which coalition members, acting alone, cannot
gain desired results from others. In other words, coalitions form to
remedy or to offset power imbalances among the negotiating parties.'
B. Bargaining Power
As negotiating coalitions form to acquire power, it is useful to
understand what bargaining power means. Parties enter bargaining
relationships because they think they need one another to get something
5. BACHRACH & LAWLER, supra note 1, at 8, 45, 106.
6. Id. at 8.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 1994]
they want. Neediness varies from situation to situation and ranges from
the simplest of wants or desires that many parties could satisfy to serious
needs or necessities that only a few parties can satisfy. If a person wanted
to buy a new shirt, but did not really need one and did not have anything
particular in mind, he or she could browse in many stores, and yet not buy
one. If, however, one's business employees are going to strike, and
cannot be replaced, then there is little choice but to deal with them.
These simple examples clarify that a party's need to deal with
another confers a kind of power or leverage on the other.' In negotiation,
the parties' power is a relational matter and arises from the negotiating
parties' dependence on one another to obtain something they want - that
is, to satisfy their respective needs - from that particular relationship."
In a negotiation between Sally and Harry, Sally's bargaining power is
dependent on Harry's need for her to obtain something he wants. It may
also depend on Sally's need to get something she wants from Harry.
If Sally does not need what Harry controls or can provide her, or
if she needs or wants it but has other ways of getting it, she does not need
to negotiate with Harry. She is independent, rather than dependent.
Sally's independence, assuming that Harry does not have a similar
capability of satisfying his wants aside from negotiating with Sally, confers
bargaining power on her. Harry's need to obtain particular results from
Sally increases his dependence on her, and consequently, decreases his
power with respect to negotiating with her.' Sally has power in her
negotiation with Harry if she has at least one reasonably good alternative
way to get what she wants outside of settling with him. She also has
power over Harry if he does not have a viable alternative way of getting
what he wants without settling with her.
On the other hand, if Sally is only able to meet her goals by
7. The term "power" has unfortunate connotations of force or of a party's unilateral
ability to have its way. As used in negotiation analysis, however, it is a shorthand term that
refers to the dependency relationships that exist between the negotiating parties.
Much of negotiating comprises the parties' efforts to determine just how much,
and in what respect, they need each other to get what they want. This, in fact, is what
negotiation information trades are all about. One important matter the parties are trying to
figure out from the information they have and obtain, and through their evaluations and
assessments, is their relative dependence on one another - in other words, their relative
balance of power.
8. BACHRACH & LAWLER, supra note 1, at 56.
9. Somewhat-paradoxically, however, Harry's neediness could turn out to be a source of
power for him. Because he needs to obtain particular results, he may expend great effort to
achieve them. In other words, neediness motivates and may generate impression
management moves that persuade Sally to do what Harry wants, even though in some
absolute, objective sense, Sally has greater "real" power. Id. at 64.
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bargaining with Harry, she is dependent on Harry and has relatively less
bargaining power with respect to the item she needs from him. The
greater her need to obtain particular outcomes from negotiation, the less
power she has to bargain for those particular goals." She not only lacks
the alternative of doing without Harry, but also lacks the alternative of
dealing with Harry.
Bargaining power in negotiation is thus a relational, relative, and
changeable matter. It is not possible to say how much bargaining power a
negotiator has without considering how much the opposing negotiator has,
for it is a question of their relative dependency on one another to realize
particular outcomes.'
10. Id. at 60.
11. Of course, the parties' dependency on one another is not necessarily fixed or static;
the parties often can act to change their dependency.
For a more detailed and sophisticated discussion of the points made in this section,
and in the following sections, and for a comprehensively stated bargaining power model, see
ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, SETTLING FOR MORE 27-52 (1991). While negotiation bargaining
power is a question of relative dependency, it is useful to specify in greater detail the
elements or variables on which it depends. The apparent variables are a party's needs or
wants and its alternative ways of satisfying them. In relation to these, it is important to
consider the information a party has, a party's negotiating transaction costs, and its belief in
the other party's ability to meet its needs.
A party has some relative bargaining strength if it has an alternative way, other
than through the negotiation, of satisfying its needs. Nonetheless, if the party does not know
of an alternative, it is effectively without bargaining power. Therefore, it is important to
factor the state of a party's information about its alternatives into the bargaining power
equation. If a party is clear and certain about its alternatives, it can readily test the value of
possible settlements by comparing them with its alternatives. Where a party is uncertain or
insecure about its alternatives, it will have to discount them accordingly. Furthermore, in
seeking to discover what effective alternatives it has, a party may experience time and
expense limitations. If a party fails to gather the information it needs to specify its
alternatives realistically, then the party's relative bargaining position is weakened.
There are also other costs associated with negotiating that may factor into the
bargaining power equation. The first of these is the investment cost, the cost associated with
initiating the negotiation and carrying it to its current stage. This investment cost is further
comprised of preparation costs, research and time costs, and any lost opportunity costs
associated with the actual negotiation. All other things being equal, the more a party has
invested in a given negotiation, the more likely that party will be to settle. The party will
still need to compare any proffered settlement to its alternatives. If the party refuses to
settle, its negotiating costs become lost costs. The negotiation has made it more costly to
resort to other alternatives. The costs of negotiating may discount the value of the party's
alternatives. Thus, increasing a party's negotiation investment costs tends to decrease that
party's bargaining power.
The other important negotiation transaction cost is the anticipated cost of going
forward with negotiations. The greater this is, the more attractive the alternatives to
negotiation may become. It follows that one enhances her bargaining power by reducing the
other side's anticipated negotiation costs. If the cost of continuing negotiation is low, there is
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C. Coalition Formation
Negotiation coalitions arise when unallied parties lack the
bargaining power to get what they want from a negotiation. Coalitions
form to gather enough power for the allied parties to achieve their
common and individual goals. They ally to improve their opportunities for
getting what they want, either by finding an alternative to dealing with the
more powerful party or by altering the dependency relationships between
the negotiating parties.
Coalition formation is one way parties can change their relative
dependency on those with whom they wish to, or must, deal. Allying with
others may create new alternatives, change the available alternatives, or
bring additional resources to the negotiation. An employer may be able to
withstand a strike by one of its unions, but when all of its unions ally, it
may be forced to bargain. When asked by a single homeowner to install a
speed bump on her street, a city council may ignore the request, but when
asked by all of the homeowners in the residential district, the city council
will more likely take action.
In all situations where parties are dependent on a decision maker
less incentive to resort to alternatives to negotiation, and therefore, a party will be inclined to
continue.
Another variable to factor into the bargaining equation is a party's belief in the
other party's ability to meet its needs or wants. Suppose you wish to remodel your house
and you contact contractors for bids. Before you settle on a contractor, you will want
assurance that he is not only dependable, but also capable of doing the work you want at a
desired quality and price. If you are not persuaded that a particular contractor meets these
conditions, you will not hire him. Consequently, where a party's performance is important
in a negotiation, the other party's belief in its capability, trustworthiness, and reliability is a
critical variable. Therefore, when performance is important, the performing party can
increase its bargaining power by enhancing the other side's belief in the existence of these
qualities. On the other hand, one may weaken the performing party's bargaining position by
questioning its ability to perform.
Negotiating parties base their negotiating decisions on their perceptions of the
negotiating situation. Consequently, it is the parties' perceptions of their alternatives, the
certainty and quality of their information, their costs, and their respective abilities to perform
that determine their relative bargaining power. A negotiating party can increase its
bargaining power by bettering its alternatives, improving its information, reducing its
negotiating transaction costs, and improving the impression associated with its ability to
perform. A party can also increase its relative bargaining power by acting to decrease the
other party's bargaining power. It can do this by worsening the other party's alternatives or
that party's perceptions of its alternatives. It can undermine the other party's confidence in
the information on which that party bases its bargaining position. It can work to increase the
other party's negotiation investment cost and it can seek to convince the other party that
further negotiation transaction costs will be low. Finally, it can also increase its bargaining
power by persuading the other party that it can meet its needs better than any alternative
ways the other party has of meeting them.
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to make some decision affecting them, and the decision depends on voting
or assessment of the "politics" of the situation, the formation of coalitions
can change the alternatives available to the decision maker. This is
usually done by increasing the risk of adverse consequences flowing to the
decision maker from decisions unfavorable to a coalition or its members.
Typically, coalitions form in voting bodies, such as legislatures or
councils in which every member has an equal vote. They can also form in
any situation where a party faces a more powerful party and singly lacks
the resources to achieve its ends or to protect itself. The following
examples illustrate this notion. An investor who wants to buy a company
but does not have sufficient funds brings in other investors to achieve his
goal. One of several unions wants higher wages for its members, but the
company can maintain production even if these union members strike.
Thus, the union seeks alliances with other company unions and with the
teamsters that transport the company's goods. A developer wants to
develop acreage within a city and needs a zoning change, but powerful
"no-growth" advocates oppose development. The developer then seeks
allies among local contractors, building trade unions and suppliers, local
banks, and merchants to overcome the opposition.
Coalitions also form when some external circumstance forces
parties to agree, in order to receive a benefit or avert a problem or
catastrophe. As one example, under clean air and transportation
legislation, the federal government designates certain geographic regions
as ozone "non attainment" zones.' In order to receive federal highway
and transportation funds, cities and counties within the zone must agree on
a transportation plan that reduces auto pollution below a certain level. As
another example, the owner of a major league baseball team proposes to
sell the team to investors in another state. City officials, fans, merchants,
and local investors rally to establish a local investment group to make a
competing bid.'
D. Intracoalition Negotiation and Intercoalition Negotiation
There are two rather different negotiation processes at work as
coalitions form and attempt to maintain themselves during a negotiation
with other parties. The first is the intracoalition negotiation, which is the
negotiation involved in forming the coalition. Intracoalition negotiation
concerns the particular issues regarding how the prospective coalition
12. 23 U.S.C.A. § 104 (West Supp. 1993).
13. Marc Sandalow, S.F. Group Says Giants Lack Votes to Move, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 3,
1992, at Al.
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members identify potential alliances and how they decide to divide or
distribute the realized gains among themselves. The second is
intercoalition negotiation, which is the negotiation between a formed
coalition and other parties or other coalitions involved in the overall
negotiation. These two different negotiations are interrelated and affect
one another, in part because coalition formation may stimulate counter-
coalition formation and defensive efforts. Moreover, the deals struck to
form and maintain a coalition will shape the coalition's bargaining with
external parties.
E. Simple Coalition Dynamics4
Coalition formation occurs when parties negotiate an alliance
agreement, formally or informally, expressly or tacitly.' In order to
form a coalition, prospective coalition members must perceive that an
alliance between them will confer advantages they do not have acting
alone. Prospective coalition members will decide whether to enter a
coalition, and which coalition to enter, by comparing their respective
potential gains from either acting alone or from entering the possible
alliances. This is most easily understood through a simple example.
Consider a negotiation between three parties, Anna, Emma, and
Paul." Assume, in terms of respective negotiating power, that Anna has
the most power and Paul the least power. In other words, in order to get
what they want, Anna is less dependent on Paul than Paul is on Anna.
Anna is also less dependent on Emma than Emma is on her, and Emma is
less dependent on Paul than Paul is on Emma. Further assume, however,
that when Paul and Emma act together, Anna is more dependent on them
than they are on her. We can symbolize these power or dependency
relationships as follows:
Anna > Emma; Anna > Paul; Emma > Paul,
(Paul and Emma) > Anna
In this situation, aside from a grand coalition of all, there are
14. See generally RAIFFA, supra note 1, at 257-74.
15. The term "alliance agreement" is used here quite loosely. The only agreement
required is one of parallel action. Many coalitions are tacitly formed when parties informally
coordinate their actions toward common ends. For example, when organizations face critical
decisions, such as budget allocations, mid- and upper-level managers sometimes form
alliances to protect budget shares. These alliances can arise even without face-to-face ally
communication. The perception of shared interests will often lead to parallel action, such as
similar voting.
16. The vignette and scenario were suggested by the pure coalition game, and discussion
of it, found in RAIFFA, supra note 1, at 262-67.
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three possible coalitions, as follows:
Emma and Paul (against Anna)
Anna and Emma (against Paul)
Anna and Paul (against Emma)
Paul, knowing he is the weakest of the three, might reason as
follows: "If all three of us act solely for ourselves, I will come out worst
in this negotiation because I am the weakest. Depending on what either of
them will give me to join them, I may be better offjoining Anna or Emma
to form a coalition against the other. Emma is likely to align with me
because she too is weaker than Anna."
"But wait! I see another possibility that may result in an even
greater gain for me. If Anna knows I am thinking of aligning with Emma,
she will realize that she is overpowered in this negotiation. She therefore
may be willing to offer me more to join her against Emma than Emma
offers me to join her against Anna. Amazingly, although I'm the weakest
of the three, I gain considerable strength from my ability to enter an
alliance, and I can maximize my gains by playing Emma against Anna!"
Paul has not quite thought this through well enough yet, for
Emma and Anna can play the same game. If Paul seeks to exact too much
from Emma as a price for aligning with her, Emma can approach Anna to
see whether she can maximize her results by aligning with Anna rather
than Paul. In other words, when faced with a coalition, the noncoalition
party may seek to weaken or break the coalition apart by changing the
terms of its offers to one or more of the coalition parties.
F. Coalition Formation, Countercoalition Processes, and
Share Allocation
Coalition formation thus may lead to countercoalition processes.
Based solely on a rational calculation of maximal gains - loyalty and
coalition partner skills left out of the equation - a party will defect from a
coalition if it gets a greater payoff from an alternative coalition. The
possibility that a coalition member will defect from a coalition enhances
the bargaining power of that member both inside and outside of the
coalition. A member's ability to join another coalition gives her an
alternative of not dealing with the coalition in which she initially finds
herself. The possibility of remaining with the coalition gives her an
alternative to joining the coalition that seeks to entice her away from her
initial alliance. Consequently, a coalition formed solely to maximize its
members' gains, narrowly conceived, will be stable only if its members
cannot get a greater payoff outside the coalition than inside it. Of course,
in real life, social factors such as loyalty, moral pressures, the possibility
of future dealings with coalition-mates, and the like can override the
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temptation to seek single-minded and opportunistic gains.
Nonetheless, the general point is valid. Practically speaking,
parties can exact a price for agreeing to join a coalition, and exact an
additional price for agreeing to stay with a coalition. Consider again the
negotiation between Anna, Emma, and Paul described above. Assume,
for illustrative purposes, that the parties have the following points in
respective negotiating power: Anna - forty, Emma - thirty, Paul - twenty.
Assume also that the total available payoff from the negotiation is ninety,
and that the parties can, through their negotiation processes, divide
whatever points they collectively control. If they do not agree on a
division of points, no one gets any.'1 Consequently, if there is a grand
coalition of the three, they can divide ninety points between them as they
wish. If Anna and Emma align; but Paul does not join them, Anna and
Emma can divide seventy points as they wish, and Paul gets nothing. If
Emma and Paul align, but Anna does not join them, Emma and Paul can
divide fifty points as they wish, and Anna gets nothing. If they do not
agree, they each come away with nothing.
The negotiation might go something like this. Anna, Emma, and
Paul begin negotiating as separate parties. Paul initially proposes that the
three of them agree to divide the ninety points equally. Anna rejects this
immediately and demands forty points of the possible ninety points
available for division and proposes that Emma get thirty and Paul twenty.
Anna's equity argument is based on the fact that forty points is what she
contributes to the overall total.
Emma responds, "No, wait a minute! I will not agree to that. I
can get thirty points if I enter an agreement with Paul and leave you out.
I am not going to enter any agreement with you unless I can get more than
thirty points. In fact, if you and I enter an agreement together we can
split seventy points. I want half of that, that is, thirty-five points to join
you."
Paul then enters the negotiation. "Hey, I do not want to get left
out of this! If you two enter that agreement, I will not get any points!
Anna, I propose that you align with me, and of the sixty points we have to
divide, I will let you have thirty-six and I will take twenty-four. That way
you get one more than you get by joining Emma."
"Well, Emma," says Anna, "it looks like I can do better by
joining Paul than by joining you. Can you better your offer?"
"Perhaps I was hasty," says Emma. "I can see that you can play
me off against Paul. I will agree to give you thirty-nine points and I will
take thirty-one."
17. Id. at 262, table 18.
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"Oh, boy," Paul interjects, "that will leave me with nothing.
Emma, if you agree to align with me, I will let you take thirty-two points,
and I will take eighteen."
"Wait," says Anna, "I am frozen out that way. Emma, I will
give you thirty-three points if you align with me. No. No. Wait! Paul, I
will give you twenty-two points to align with me. That will leave me with
thirty-eight."
"Then I would get nothing," Emma jumps in. "Let us do it this
way. Let us have a three-way agreement. You take your thirty-eight
points. I will take thirty, and Paul can have his twenty-two."
"Oh, no!," responds Anna. "I will agree to give Paul twenty-two
points if you are not in the picture. After all, I only need him because
you will not give me a better deal. I am not going to allow you in unless
I get something more for it. I want at least fifty points. I will continue to
agree that Paul gets twenty-two. That leaves you with eighteen points.
That is a good deal considering that we could freeze you out and leave you
with nothing."
"Wait just a minute! I am not going to let you get away with
that, Anna! Look, between us, Paul and I command fifty points. I will
offer him at least twenty-three points to join me. That is one better than
you are giving him. And for me, I get twenty-seven points, and that is
nine points better than your proposed deal."
"I can do better for you than that, Emma," Anna responds, "If
you align with me, I will let you have twenty-eight points and I will take
forty-two."
And so on. As is evident from this example, parties proposing to
enter coalitions somehow have to determine their share allocation of
whatever results the coalition is able to obtain. More importantly,
18. In reality, this is often unstated. Indeed, parties may privately calculate or speculate
about possible gains. In the example, however, the effort turned into a prolonged bidding
without an equilibrium point. This occurred simply because each party's only stake was
maximizing its individual gain. In realistic circumstances, prospective coalition partners
apparently intuitively realize they face the prospect of interminable, inconclusive bidding, and
therefore resort to some more principled basis of share division. THEoDoRE CAPLOW, Two
AGAINST ONE: CoALrITONS IN TRIADS 26 (1968). The most likely ideas they would use to
allocate shares would be either equity, shares proportional to the resources the respective
parties contributed to the coalition's success, or equality, equal shares, or a midpoint solution
lying between equitable and equal shares. For a discussion on the equity principle, see
William A. Gamson, A Theory of Coalition Fonnation, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 373, 376 (1961).
For an examination of the equality and mid-point principles, see S.S. Komorita & Jerome
Chertkoff, A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Fonnation, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 149 (1973). See
generally BACHRACH & LAWLER, supra note 1, at 48-61.
Interestingly, the share allocation principle that the parties ultimately use also
affects just what coalition will form. This is easiest to see from considering the example
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however, the share allocation between prospective coalition partners is a
negotiation like other negotiations. Forming a coalition is a
problem-solving response to perceived weakness, and if the coalition
succeeds in its aims, the parties to it in effect create value through
alliance. Nevertheless, they still face a value-claiming problem, dividing
the value created." Coalition members will share in whatever gains the
coalition obtains, and they must decide their respective shares. The
bargaining on that point can be distributive, a hard-bargaining contest as
in the example, or it can be problem-solving, whereby the parties stumble
on or resort to an agreed upon principle to decide what each of them shall
receive.2
The way coalition members solve the share allocation problem has
important consequences for the maintenance and stability of the coalition.
In the example, the possible coalition members were all acting
opportunistically, as if they were interested only in the size of their returns
from cooperation. The single interest holding any proposed alliance
together was individual gain. Such opportunistic coalitions are unstable.
Where shared interest is not strong, coalition partners may defect when
offered more by an external party. In such circumstances, coalitions must
both be vigilant and prepared to respond to possible or threatened
defections by renegotiating the original terms of coalition formation.
Furthermore, although all coalitions will in some way distribute
gain following success, because all coalition members will realize some
kind of gain on coalition success, the example suggests it is not always
wise for coalition members to attempt to allocate shares in advance. The
bargaining process involved in allocating shares may divide the parties
rather than bring them together. This seems particularly likely when all
the coalition members seek the same kind of gain, such as a share of
again. In the Anna-Paul coalition, Anna commands twice the resources that Paul does, 40
points to 20 points. If equity is the basis of share division, then, on success of the coalition,
Anna should receive twice what Paul receives. If, however, Paul joins Emma in a coalition,
and that coalition also uses equity to divide gains, then Paul will receive two-thirds of what
Emma receives, for Emma contributes 30 points to his 20. All other things being equal, this
should incline both Paul and Emma to enter a coalition with each other rather than with
Anna, for they will each get a larger share. In terms of actual receipts, neither are better off
than they would be in a coalition with Emma, but they might prefer it because they feel less
dominated. BACHRACH & LAWLER, supra note 4, at 63-66.
19. For the distinction between value creation and value claiming, see DAVID A. LAX &
JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND
COMPETITIVE GAIN 30-33 (1986).
20. For a discussion on the use of objective principles to distribute negotiation gain, see
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 84-86 (1981).
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money or a portion of a contract.
Where coalition members seek different kinds of gain, they can
collaborate more readily. Consider, for example, the situation where an
environmental group allies with a developer of large-acreage luxury home
sites to oppose the development plan of a high density home builder. The
gain the environmental group seeks is lower population density to limit
adverse environmental impacts. The gain the luxury home builder seeks is
profit through exclusivity. These parties can align readily, and probably
without a discussion of share allocation. Their success as a coalition will
give each of them what they desire.
G. Real Coalitions
Matters are rarely as simple and unambiguous in real life as they
are in hypotheticals. While the example demonstrates some of the
dynamics underlying -coalition formation, it is highly simplified and
certainly does not capture them all. Among other things, it leaves out
consideration of such factors as personal interaction, investment in
coalition-building, information availability and costs, loyalty, ideological
compatibility of the participants, and perceived possibilities of future use
of the developed relationship.
In real negotiations, parties may not be completely clear about
their dependencies on one another. When they form coalitions, they
cannot necessarily be certain about how their joined forces will change the
configuration of their dependencies on the other parties to the negotiation.
This is particularly true where the other- parties may also ally as a
responsive move. Furthermore, negotiating parties often value the same
things differently. Parties' respective valuations may become clear only
after they trade. Consequently, in forming an alliance, partners may not
be able to determine in advance their respective shares of the distribution
realizable if the alliance succeeds. This uncertainty is increased when the
gains or receipts of coordinated action are themselves uncertain or variable
or differentially attractive to coalition members.
To illustrate this point, consider the coalition of nations that
formed to fight the Persian Gulf War. At the initiation of the war, its
outcome was uncertain. Even if the allying partners expected victory,
none could predict how substantial a victory, its overall costs, or the costs
each partner would experience. Coalition members also had different
stakes in a successful outcome. The security of oil resources was a
concern to many of the coalition members, but not to all members. Saudi
Arabia hoped to retain its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Egypt and
Syria were partially motivated by political considerations, and Egypt was
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also motivated by a loan-forgiveness side deal with the United States. 1
Perhaps out of long-term strategic alliance considerations, Japan agreed to
help pay for the war, despite the fact that it did not have significant oil
security concerns.?
Ill. BUILDING AND SHAPING COALITIONS
A. Internal Coalition Negotiations
By joining a coalition, a party gains something it could not
otherwise obtain, but it also pays a price. The ability of a potential
coalition member to extract gain from joining a coalition turns on the
question of how dependent the coalition is on that party to add to the
bargaining power it needs to reach the desired results. What a party gains
and what it pays therefore depend on its relative value to the coalition, and
that in turn is partly a matter of what the other parties to a coalition bring
to it. A party's value may also depend upon the role of non-coalition
members. For example, if a countercoalition begins to form, an
uncommitted party may find itself the object of a bidding war, and
therefore will be highly valued. On the other hand, it might also be left
out ltogether as competing coalitions maneuver to enlist other players.
Coalition-building may be even more complicated, however, as
coalition-builders may not fully know exactly what resources potential
members might bring to the negotiation. As builders acquire information,
they may shift their focus to other potential partners or change the
proposed terms of the coalition. The external negotiation in which the
coalition is involved may provide information that causes parties to revalue
their own positions and the value of any coalition. Furthermore, potential
members of a tentative coalition may not be able to finalize their shares of
any coalition gains until the coalition concludes its external bargaining.
Members' shares will depend upon what the coalition gains in the overall
bargain, and that may depend on what the allies contribute at the very end
of the bargaining. The contribution that any given coalition member
makes to the overall result may not be known until the end of play. For
example, the single vote that creates the majority necessary to pass
legislation loses its determinative value when others join the majority just
before the vote.
21. Michael Ross & Melissa Healy, Cheney, Baker Silent on Attacking Iraq, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1990, at A9.
22. James Sterngold, Tokyo Agrees to Pay Off Shortfall in Gulf War Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1991, at A15.
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Coalitions can also impede efficient bargaining.' Coalition
partners may agree that any final external bargain must meet certain
conditions. They may impose such conditions to insure that each partner
gets what it wants out of the external negotiation. In doing so, coalitions
may impose such constraints on their negotiator that he is unable to make
the best possible tradeoffs. '
B. Coalitional Stability
If coalition members are merely self-interested and opportunistic,
then coalitions would appear to be volatile and unstable. Nonetheless,
many coalitions remain intact for the duration of a negotiation or even
longer. This might occur if coalition members had compatible interests,
compatible ideologies, affectional ties, or other loyalties. Coalitions are
also stable where members see potential future advantage from the present
relationship. Thus, a member may forego short-term gain, or even suffer
a loss, as a price of maintaining a relationship in anticipation of a possible
long-term gain.
Even where such factors are not important, there is an additional
reason for coalitional stability. Parties invest time, effort, and resources
in creating coalitions and creating expectations. As they do, their
positions and commitments may change because of the alliance. There are
costs involved in forming coalitions, in breaking them, and in creating new
coalitions. Such costs impede coalition restructuring.
Furthermore, coalitions often form under conditions of uncertainty
with regard to results, the members' relative interests, and possible shares
in results.' By adding parties to a coalition, the predictions, evaluations,
assessments, and guesses that form the bases of judgment during
negotiation may be further complicated. These factors of uncertainty,
investment, commitment, and information, and the added costs incurred in
shifting alliances make coalitions more stable.'
23. For a discussion of efficiency in bargaining, see RAIFFA, supra note 1, at 135-42,
148-65.
24. To avoid the situation where the negotiator is unable to reach gains that are on the
table, it would be better to link the coalition's internal and external negotiations. Rather than
having individual coalition members constrain the negotiator to insure that they do not suffer
a loss, they could agree to compensate one another. If the coalition's external negotiation
will produce winners and losers within the coalition, the winners should agree to compensate
the losers. Ralph L. Keeney & Howard Raiffa, Structuring and Analyzing Values for
Multiple-Issue Negotiations, in NEGoTIATION ANALYsIS 131, 139-40 (H. Payton Young ed.,
1991).
25. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
26. Cf. supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Where coalition parties are represented organizations rather than
individuals, coalition restructuring may be even less likely, for it is
notoriously difficult to get organizations to change course. Depending on
the organization's structure, the costs of providing information to relevant
actors and getting their approvals can be quite high. For example, trade
associations or unions cannot convene their memberships for each shift in
coalition politics. One moves mountains, if at all, only rarely.
Depending on the nature of the coalition, and on the character of
the negotiation in which it is involved, there may be some tendency toward
what we might call "coalitional inertia." Even when coalition members
have no pay-off reasons for staying in a coalition, other forces may incline
them to remain. Although a coalition-member may not leave the coalition,
it can certainly threaten to do so. A member can still use its position to
bluff for a greater share of the payoff. Whether other coalition members
will call the bluff or pay depends on how well they analyze the threatening
member's actual position and alternatives.
C. Bringing Parties on Board
In many situations, it may be fairly easy to determine which
parties are likely to form a coalition. A coalition founder will have a
sense of whose support it needs to develop sufficient power to create a
winning coalition. But knowing which parties to approach does not mean
that one can actually approach them. Indeed, a coalition founder may not
even have a relationship with a party deemed essential to create a winning
team. In such cases, founders often build support by persuading critical
players, those influential with others and to whom others listen, to join a
coalition early. Once they have done so, their participation in the coalition
becomes a resource the coalition can use to persuade others to join.
Similarly, a coalition builder could follow a strategy of using
intermediaries who could approach the essential party and persuade it to
join the coalition. Indeed, even aside from the process of coalition
building, any party needing others' approval to get something done can
follow this "backward mapping"27 strategy of lining up parties to insure
support.
Starting with the party whose agreement is ultimately needed.
. one then works backward, asking whose prior assent would
maximize the probability of agreement from the parties
ultimately needed. Then, from that prior group of parties, ask
27. Lax & Sebenius, supra note 1, at 180.
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who is most likely to agree and whose assent prior to
approaching this group would be most helpful. By this logic,
one can work backward from an ultimate target to a present
situation.2
D. Internal Winners and Losers; Side Deals
Sometimes, in order to create a winning coalition, founding
members will have to recruit parties who stand to lose more from the
alliance than they gain. Alternatively, a coalition's potential gains and
losses and each partner's respective shares may not be clear until the
overall negotiation concludes. In either case, fashioning and maintaining a
coalition may require the allies to redistribute possible gains and losses
among themselves in ways contrary to how they actually fall out in the
negotiation. To maintain a coalition, winners may have to compensate
losers for losses incurred from the alliance by making side deals with
them.
A clear example of a side deal on the international level occurred
in connection with the formation of the coalition which successfully
conducted the Persian Gulf war. To isolate Iraq from other Muslim
countries, the United States believed it was essential to enlist Egypt's
support. In joining the allies against Iraq, Egypt risked losing standing
and influence in the Muslim world and also ran the risk of economic loss.
The United States gained Egypt's support and participation in the war by
forgiving a $6.7 billion military aid debt Egypt owed the United States.2'
As a Muslim state, Egypt may have had little to gain directly from
participating in a war with Iraq. The United States made a side deal with
Egypt to compensate it for any losses it incurred in joining the alliance.
E. Adding or Subtracting Issues
Another way to form or to solidify a coalition is to add or
subtract issues to a prospective negotiation.' The parties to a negotiation
define what issues they will negotiate. Thus it is always open to a party to
attempt to widen or narrow a negotiation. In order to bring a party into a
coalition, a builder may have either to add or subtract issues that concern
that party. Rather than make a side deal to gain the allegiance of a
prospective negotiation member, the coalition reconfigures the negotiation
28. Id.
29. See Ross & Healy, supra note 21, at A9.
30. S BN1us, supra note 1, at 203.
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in order to provide a prospective gain for an otherwise reluctant
prospective coalition partner. If an issue is added, it is equivalent to a
side payment. If an issue is subtracted, it alleviates a potential loss.
The tactic of adding or subtracting issues to shape a coalition is
common. For example, imagine one of an employer's two unions wants
to renegotiate a wage contract while the other is interested primarily in
working conditions. The two ally to present a common front on wages
and working conditions. A group of faculty wants to revise a school's
curriculum, but other faculty are opposed because the revisions threaten to
increase faculty workload. The parties agree to make teaching workloads
an explicit issue. A Supreme Court Justice, assigned to write a majority
opinion, has difficulty gaining support for the narrow opinion she has
drafted. She revises it to address issues other potential members of the
majority want raised.
F. Adding or Subtracting Parties
Adding parties or subtracting parties from a tentative coalition has
effects similar to adding or subtracting issues. Indeed, adding or
subtracting parties may be a way to add or subtract issues. But this
arithmetic may have other effects as well.
[A]ddition of parties is likely when they (1) have a tangible
interest in or influence on the substance of the negotiation; (2)
may strengthen an existing coalition directly or by leverage
from unrelated issues; or (3) enable more binding commitments
to be made. Subtraction of parties may take place for opposite
reasons, as well as to reduce complexity and information costs
and to provide focal points for larger settlements."1
The following are examples that illustrate this point. Three
organizations jointly apply for and receive a grant, but they are thereafter
unable to agree on specific ways to spend the money. The granting
agency enters the dispute to help the parties renegotiate the terms of the
grant. Two rural counties, adjoining a heavily populated county
containing a major city, refuse to join a public regional planning
organization for fear of domination by the populous county. Other county
members of the planning organization call in federal authorities, who have
regional planning monies to dispense, to persuade the rural counties to
join.
31. Id. at 209.
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In these situations, the outside party, not originally involved in the
negotiations, is nonetheless interested in potential negotiation outcomes.
The outside party intervenes, either on its own or at another's request, to
protect and advance its interest, and by so doing changes the bargaining
configuration. The entry of the outside party changes the original
constraints of the situation, either adding issues or changing the
alternatives available to the parties in the negotiation.
G. Intercoalition Bargaining
Parties form negotiating coalitions to improve their power
positions in a negotiation. Weaker parties and parties sharing other
perceived common interests are thus likely to enter coalitions. '  As
parties enter coalitions to increase their bargaining power, coalitions may
stimulate counter-coalition efforts to break up the coalition or the
formation of counter-coalitions. A counter-coalition is likely to form
around a set of common interests that are likely to conflict with those that
were the ground of the initial coalition's formation. If counter-coalition
members actually shared a significant number of interests with coalition
members, they would likely ally with them rather than the
counter-coalition.
What this suggests is that while the intracoalition negotiation
involved in forming coalitions is a problem-solving activity, once
coalitions form, intercoalition bargaining is more likely to be competitive
or distributive in character.' This is not to say that intercoalition
bargaining will inevitably be distributive. Instead, where coalitions form
around conflicting sets of shared interests, the underlying conflict of
interest and psychological investment in a coalition once it is formed will
incline the coalitions to bargain competitively.
Interestingly, however, because coalitions form in response to
power imbalances, coalitions -may also induce integrative bargaining.
Here, negotiating parties are more likely to bargain integratively when
they are at least roughly equivalent in bargaining power, or when one
party or another cannot in effect dictate the outcome.
32. Gamson, supra note 18, at 376.
33. BACHRAcH & LAWLER, supra note 1, at 110-11.
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IV. NEconxANO AGAImsT COALrIONS
A. Exploiting Differential Interests Within Coalitions
In multi-party negotiations, different parties may appear to have
compatible or allied interests and therefore may appear to be natural allies
likely to form a coalition. For example, when the government proposes to
build a new dam, developers, real estate brokers, bankers, and farmers
often support the proposal while environmentalists, river rafters, and local
residents often fight it. When several unions bargain with an employer,
the unions generally appear willing to support each other. In such
situations, natural and predictable alliances are apparent.
Nevertheless, apparent natural alliances may not be what they
seem to be. Apparent coalitions, while often presenting a common front
at first glance, usually consist of different stakeholders having different
interests and priorities. Some apparent coalitions are only nominally
coalitions. Confronting a coalition with choices emphasizing the
differences between its members can split it apart or cause it, through its
internal negotiation processes, to moderate its demands.
B. Splitting Coalitions
Many coalitions are held together only by an apparent or assumed
commonality of interest between members. In some circumstances, it may
be possible to split such a coalition by defining an upcoming negotiation
with it in a way that exploits the different interests and priorities of
coalition members. Lax and Sebenius give a good example of this using
the National Football League (NFL) and the Players' Association.' The
Association was negotiating for the players' proposed salary schedules
dependent upon their position and seniority. The NFL resisted, and a
strike ensued. The NFL then made an offer of limited free agency, an
offer attractive to some of the star players, who then crossed the picket
line. The free agency offer benefitted both the star players, who received
more money, and the NFL, as the stars brought more fans into the
stadiums. The NFL offer thus drew the star players from the player
coalition and weakened it. '
Redefining a negotiation issue, by making a new offer invoking
interests shared by some opposing parties but not others, is a common
34. Lax & Sebenius, supra note 1, at 158-59.
35. Id.
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tactic used to split or weaken coalitions. To take another recent example,
the coalition that fought the Gulf War against Iraq also imposed
reparations sanctions on Iraq following the war.' One sanction included
the United Nations' control of Iraq's oil sales and revenues, which were to
be applied to compensate Iraq's. victims. Iraq resisted and attempted to
defy these requirements. To counter this resistance, some of the Gulf War
Allies threatened to seize $1 billion worth of oil payments due to Iraq as
well as undelivered Iraqi crude oil. Iraq then made an offer to reopen
talks and stated it would donate five percent of its proposed oil sale
proceeds to buy relief supplies for famine-ridden Somalia and war-tom
Bosnia.3" This offer was an obvious effort by Iraq to appeal to those
members of the U.N. deeply concerned with the suffering in Somalia and
Bosnia. Iraq's strategy was to weaken the opposing U.N. coalition by
adding an issue that Iraq hoped would split the coalition.
Another way to divide and to weaken a coalition is to ally with a
party that has ties to, or a set of interests similar to, a coalition-member.
As the benefits or payoffs associated with a particular coalition are not
always clear, this move may cause the target member of the coalition, that
member whose interests are similar to those of the party with whom the
counter-coalition allies, to reassess its allegiance to the coalition. If the
parties identified as having interests similar to its own are on the other
side of a negotiation, perhaps, it may reason, it has misjudged the situation
and the ways in which its interests might best be served.
There is a general lesson here. When negotiating against a
coalition, it is essential to analyze the disparate interests of each coalition
member as these interests may be implicated in the negotiation. When a
party negotiating against a coalition discovers it has interests common to,
or compatible with, those of one or more opposing coalition members, it
may attempt to frame an offer advancing those interests. This can have
effects of either splitting the coalition or creating a de facto ally within the
other coalition's camp.
In contrast, a coalition-builder must anticipate splitting moves and
be prepared to meet them. This too requires knowledge and analysis of
coalition members' interests. It is, however, a knowledge different than
that used to identify and form the coalition in the first place. A
coalition-builder must also understand and analyze the possible interests of
opposing parties, for it is these interests that are the impetus of
coalition-splitting offers.
36. They did not succeed. The U.N. Security Council ordered the seizure of Iraqi oil
assets. Stanley Meisler, Council Orders Frozen Iraq Oil Assets Seized, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 3,
1992, at A3.
37. Id.
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V. INCREASING ONE'S OwN GAIN WITHIN A COALITION
A. Using Cross-Cutting De Facto Alliances
There is a complex interplay between a coalition's external
bargaining and its internal bargaining, the negotiation between its
members. A natural alliance of interest may cut across coalitions, but
coalitions will not necessarily decompose or fracture when their members
share interests with opposing parties or with members of opposing
coalitions. What may occur instead is that each coalition will moderate its
demands or reshape its positions so that those members who have a de
facto natural alliance with members of the opposing coalition will not
defect. Parties who are members of a coalition thus can exploit their
community of interest with their opponents' community of interest in order
to move their coalition in a direction that better serves their own interests.
In other words, coalition members can sometimes use the coalition's
external bargaining situation to give them leverage in their coalition's
internal bargaining.
B. Using External Negotiations to Obtain Internal Concessions
Strategically placed coalition members, usually those who
effectively control the coalition's bargaining representative, can sometimes
use the pressures created by the external negotiation to force or persuade
other coalition members to make concessions within the coalition. A good
example of this arises in international trade negotiations.
Trade negotiations require a balancing of many
interests, both within and across national lines. The main lines
of cleavage are the differences between those industries seeking
access to foreign markets and who are free traders versus those
competing against foreign imports and who are protectionists.
In this internationalized brokering of interests, access to the
external negotiation increased the capacity to balance interests
internally. The greater the access that government agencies
dealing with constituency groups had to the external
negotiation, the greater the likelihood that they could trade off
internally to reduce the more extreme demands of some groups.
Extreme demands on other countries in trade negotiations
almost always invoke a "payment" in return. Because the STR
[State Trade Representation], working through the SAC
[Private Sector Advisory Committee] system, could transmit
back to the internal constituency what the costs might be of
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taking certain extreme positions, it helped to keep such
positions from being taken in the first place.'
C. Manipulating One's Own Coalition
Coalitions are not monolithic. Nevertheless, bargaining requires
one member to speak for the coalition. In simple terms, all coalition
members do not necessarily participate in the bargaining. Indeed, there
may even be communication protocols, formal or informal, within
coalitions, so that only certain parties speak with other parties. Not all
members of a coalition necessarily have the same information. Instead,
some will only have the information that the coalition's bargaining
representative gives them. Consequently, a coalition's bargaining
representative is in a strategic position; she can use its access to and
control of information to solidify or manipulate her own coalition. She
can do this to facilitate an agreement between negotiating coalitions and to
manage information for her own gain. A coalition's selection of a
bargaining agent is a critical act, and the relationship with the agent is
crucial.
VI. THE NEGOTIATOR AS AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE
A. Negotiating for Others
Negotiating as an agent or representative of another, a client or a
union, a management group, an agency, or an interest group or
association, places potentially significant constraints on both the substance
and manner of bargaining. The represented parties will usually have both
substantive expectations regarding negotiation outcomes and behavioral
expectations about how the negotiator should conduct the negotiation.
Even in cases where additional parties are not directly involved in a
negotiation, but merely form in observing audience or a psychological
presence, "phantom" players at the table, a negotiator may feel pressures
and restrictions on the way he bargains.3'
There is a range of possible ways in which a negotiator can carry
out the role of representing another party in a negotiation. In any given
negotiation, the nature of the representation depends very much upon the
38. GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND
NEGOTIATION 316-17 (1986).
39. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & B. BROwN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND
NEGOTIATION 44-45 (1975).
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relationship between the negotiator and the party represented. Some
represented parties are more directive, involved, demanding, and
communicative than others. The parties may refrain from supervising the
negotiators and may place significant trust and authority in the agents.
Beyond these evident matters, however, there is good evidence that the
very fact of representation introduces particular psychological dynamics
into a negotiation that would not otherwise exist.
It appears that bargaining as a representative inclines negotiators
to bargain more adversarially or competitively, or at least with a limited
ability to consider options that the represented party has not endorsed.
The represented party may demand loyalty, commitment, and advocacy of
its positions or points of view.' In such circumstances, the situation will
motivate the negotiator to perform for his principal and to attain its
approbation. When a negotiator is accountable to another who can
evaluate and sanction his bargaining performance, whether a client or a
constituency, he is responsive to it. This is particularly true where the
negotiation is carried out in public or in the presence of the client or
constituency who can monitor the actual conduct of the negotiator.4 '
Negotiators who represent others seek the approval and positive
evaluations of those they represent. They look for validations of
competency, ability, and strength, and will take the actions thought
necessary to earn the client's favor.
These "representative capacity," "loyalty over logic,"
accountability, and face-saving effects are even stronger when the
negotiator is a member of the group represented, for then group influence
and loyalty pressures are stronger. "[A] representative of a group, having
a strong commitment to the group's position, may not merely be
handicapped in accepting an opposing position, but, on a more
fundamental level, may be impeded from being able to even recognize
superior elements in that opposing position." In other words,
bargaining as a representative may entail a "narrowing" of a negotiator's
vision, capacities, and aims. This, of course, will also affect the way in
which the negotiator bargains. Similarly, negotiators who represent others
may make certain negotiation moves, not because the moves make
substantive sense, but in order to protect or enhance their image and
reputation with their principal.
In some cases, these effects may operate even more strongly
where the negotiator is not a member or regular employee of the
40. Id. at 51-54.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 51.
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represented group, but is an independent professional. This is particularly
true for those negotiators, such as lawyers, whose normal role is that of a
professional advocate. The profession's ethical standards require the
lawyer to be a vigorous and zealous advocate for his client, and the
lawyer's general ethos, at least in the American legal system, is
adversarial.' Generally speaking, the lawyer is trained to battle for his
client and aims at winning contests, not settling them. Those who hire
lawyers often have the same understanding and hire them for that very
reason. Ethos and expectations mutually reinforce one another, and may
consequently shape negotiating behavior. This is not to say that all
lawyers subscribe to this role, nor that all those who use lawyers to
represent them in negotiations have such expectations. It does suggest,
that many lawyers, and perhaps other "hired gun" negotiators, are
naturally inclined, and their clients will expect them to bargain
adversarially and competitively.
Bargaining competitively is not always the best way to maximize
one's gains.' Indeed, competitive bargaining may cause parties to lose
potential gains and opportunities for creative joint action. It is therefore
important for focal negotiators acting in representative capacities, or
dealing with other negotiators acting as representatives, to understand the
possible pressures influencing that role. In particular, if such a negotiator
perceives problem-solving negotiation as a viable and beneficial option,
she will have to secure her ability and authority to undertake it.
B. Representing Groups and Constituencies
While all negotiators who represent other parties in a negotiation
must face conflicts between a principal's expectations and the realities of
the actual negotiation, additional problems arise when the principal is a
group or a constituency. When the negotiator represents a group, her task
may further be complicated by conflicts within it. The group may lack
consensus on goals. Different persons or coalitions within it may have
different priorities regarding goals or issues. Group members may
disagree not only about goals, but also about strategy, tactics, and
bargaining styles, and about the significance of developing particular
relationships with the other side.
Indeed, the larger and the more heterogeneous the represented
43. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSION RESPONSIBILIrY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1983); cf.
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEOAL ETHICS § 10.3 (practitioner's ed. 1986).
44. See generally FISHER & URY, supra note 20; LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 19;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
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group, the more likely the group itself will be in conflict. Individuals
comprising the group will have different interests and needs, and different
perceptions of the bargaining situation. Subgroups, coalitions, or factions
may also form. Whether the larger group is composed of relatively
independent individuals, subgroups, or a combination of the two, these
different actors will likely operate from different informational bases,
different levels of intelligence and experience, and will interpret, assess,
and value differently what is involved in the negotiation. In addition, the
issues to be negotiated, as well as their possible outcomes, may have
different impacts on individuals or subgroups, causing these actors to
respond differently to various proposed negotiation outcomes.
Even where a group is unified on some issues when negotiation
begins, consensus may dissolve as negotiation progresses and group
members' perceptions of the issues and bargaining situation may change.
The group may continue to lack consensus on issues unresolved within the
group prior to negotiation. Other, unexpected issues may also arise during
the course of.the negotiation. Inded, the very process of negotiation may
stimulate members' awareness of such issues and create incentives to work
them out. Thus, even while engaged in negotiations with others, a group
may have to engage in its own internal negotiations. These negotiations
will affect the agent at the table, and the agent may also participate in or
even manage the internal negotiations.
The negotiator who represents a group is in a critical position. It
is useful to think of the negotiator in such a situation as a political actor
having to respond to the demands and expectations of a constituency.
Where the group is unified, he will be subject to the group's substantive
expectations regarding negotiation outcomes and its behavioral expectations
regarding the manner in which he will carry out bargaining, the latter
possibly enforced by group surveillance. Where the group is not unified,
the negotiator, as the individual at a critical decision point, will be the
target or focus of group members' influence attempts. On the other hand,
the negotiator develops information during bargaining from which he can
assess bargaining possibilities. He is in a privileged position vis-a-vis the
group and can influence its decisions.
There are group politics that will arise in representative
bargaining, and the negotiator will inevitably be involved. But the
negotiator in such a situation is in a delicate political position, for he
occupies two roles that are potentially in conflict. As a group
representative, he has a proscribed role in which he is expected to be loyal
to the group and to act according to instructions or only in ways that will
further its defined interests. As a negotiator, he has the functional role of
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working with the other side's negotiator to craft a settlement. 6 Because
he is at the bargaining table, the negotiator will have a much more realistic
sense of what is possible in the negotiation and how best to achieve it.
Unfortunately, his assessment may be at odds with that of his constituency.
If the group he represents takes a hard-bargaining approach and expects
him to demonstrate his toughness and ability to deliver the results it
expects, his flexibility to overtly undertake problem-solving or integrative
bargaining is limited. Indeed, the need to impress his constituency, at
least if it oversees his bargaining, may even constrain the negotiator's
ability to develop a cooperative, friendly, and trusting relationship with the
other side's negotiator. In such a situation, the negotiator is aware of the
audience for which he must perform, even if it is not present. This
pressured performance may interfere with what, in his judgment,
constitutes the best way to bargain under the circumstances.
C. Working with Clients and Constituencies
Negotiators caught in such "boundary"" role conflicts have a
number of options regarding ways in which to proceed. Indeed, whether
the negotiator represents a single client or a constituency, the problems her
representative role presents are similar. The only significant difference
arises from the fact of constituency politics. Plainly, the politics within
the constituency, and the politics of working with, or on behalf of, a
constituency, deeply affect the ways in which a negotiator goes about her
work for a constituency. Nevertheless, because the two kinds of
representation involve similar problems, I will treat them together, noting
where necessary, unique problems involved in constituency representation.
Ideally, the negotiator working for a client or constituency needs
its trust and confidence and its authority to operate freely and flexibly to
craft the best possible agreement. But a negotiator will not always have
that freedom of action. Her client or constituency may have its own
confirmed views of what it desires and how to achieve these desires.
Within a constituency, there may be factions or coalitions, and the
reigning power may need to deliver certain results to retain its position.
The constituency may view the negotiator as a mere agent of its will and
not as an active player in determining what to seek in the negotiation.
What a negotiator can do in such circumstances is highly
contingent on the character, unity, and sophistication of her client or
45. RIcHAAD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS 283-89 (1965).
46. Id. at 284.
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constituency. Her freedom of action also depends on her skill,
sophistication, and the nature of her working relationship with her
principal. There are a number of general possibilities. When the
principal's substantive expectations appear to be greater than the
negotiator's considered judgment of what is possible from the negotiation,
the negotiator can work, in advance .of settlement, to reshape those
expectations. The negotiator takes an active role in working with her
client or constituency to create the substantive flexibility that she believes
is needed to negotiate effectively.
To maximize negotiating room, the negotiator needs to educate
her principal about the advantages and disadvantages of various ways of
negotiating. In doing so, she should seek authority from the client to
negotiate flexibly. If the principal gives the negotiator broad authority to
negotiate as she deems appropriate, she obviously will have to work with
the principal to discover its true interests in the negotiation, to anticipate
the other side's interests, and to develop possible alternative solutions to
the presented bargaining problem.
She can accomplish this by working with the client or
constituency as it develops its substantive bargaining expectations and
aspirations. If the party's views are already settled, she may have to
educate it regarding bargaining possibilities and attempt to persuade it to
revise its expectations. Working with a group is more difficult than
working with an individual client because there are more persons involved,
making group consensus harder to achieve, and once achieved, even
harder to revise. Factions or coalitions within the group will also
complicate the negotiator's task, and the negotiator may even have to
negotiate alliances within the group that will enable the group to be
effective in external negotiations.
The client or constituency, however, may have settled substantive
expectations that the negotiator cannot alter prior to negotiation. If
negotiation will not lead to results that satisfy these expectations, the
negotiator may have to act in some way to alter her principal's
expectations so that it will both accept the results and not blame her for
failure. But that may be difficult because "the negotiator is most
vulnerable to censure by his principals if he attempts to alter their
assumptions and attitudes about the opponent during negotiations."47
Depending upon the trust vested in her, she might succeed in direct efforts
to educate the principal about the realities of the situation. If the principal
cannot be educated in this way, the negotiator may manipulate the
bargaining so that the represented party has to confront the apparent
47. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
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realities of bargaining itself, and so force it to revise its expectations.o
But a negotiator's client or constituency is likely to have not only
expectations about substantive negotiation results, but also about the way
in which the negotiator negotiates. In the case of a constituency, if it has
no representatives at the table other than the negotiator, or does not
otherwise in some way surveil her bargaining activities, she may appear to
retain flexibility to bargain in whatever way she deems most useful. If the
resulting proposed agreement does not better or meet her client's or
constituency's substantive expectations concerning outcomes, she will have
the problem of justifying or explaining the discrepancy. She will be in
trouble if she bargained in unexpected ways. To gain flexibility, the
negotiator can work to shape her principal's behavioral expectations about
how she will bargain. The ideal way to do this would be to educate the
principal regarding all the different bargaining strategies, particularly
problem-solving, for it is the least widely understood bargaining strategy.
The latter may be a difficult task, particularly where the principal
is a group without a defined authority structure. Even if the represented
party does understand problem-solving bargaining in principle, it may not
accept it in practice. For example, one study has reported that
"[c]onstituents. . . resisted mutual gains bargaining because it generated
innovative options that they had not foreseen or approved."49 The results
were angry confrontation and increased constituent monitoring of the
negotiator. The study concluded that when attempting to bargain
integratively, a negotiator representing others may encounter severe
communication and coordination problems.
[N]egotiators are caught between constituent expectations that
they will be kept informed on every aspect of negotiations, and
the need for open, innovative discussions. Constituents could
be informed of every new idea, but this would greatly restrict
the brainstorming phase and tie negotiators up in constant
meetings with constituents. Yet, if negotiators eventually bring
back ideas to constituents that are too radical or too difficult to
understand without bringing them along gradually, the new
ideas will not be accepted. And since radically new ideas are
apt to be generated in mutual gains bargaining, constituent
management problems are heightened considerably s
48. Id. at 310.
49. Debra G. Ancona et al., The Group and What Happens on the Way to "Yes," 7
NEOTo'ATON J. 155, 167 (1991).
50. Id.
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If the negotiator cannot educate her client or constituency during
integrative bargaining or concludes she will be unable to manage relations
with her principal when she openly attempts to bargain integratively, she
has the following choices. The negotiator can ignore, at least selectively,
her principal's expectations, taking the risk that the results obtained will
justify her actions or that they will not be observed or otherwise
discovered. Alternatively, she could simply satisfy her principal's
expectations and let the results fall out as they may. Even if the outcome
results are unsatisfactory, she cannot be blamed as she expressly carried
out the constituency's wishes. Most likely, the principal will blame the
other side, not realizing that some other way of bargaining might have led
to better results. Finally, negotiators sometimes, at least to a certain
degree, collude or work with the other side in ways that will help them
with their own clients or constituencies. The negotiator might give the
appearance of bargaining as her principal expects her to bargain, while
signaling' to the other side that she is in fact more flexible and open
than her bargaining manner indicates. If the other side reads the signals
correctly, it would realize that in order to reach a satisfactory bargain, it
would have to cooperate with the negotiator in allowing her to maintain
the appearance of hard-bargaining. It could, for example, adopt and
publicize a reciprocal apparent hard-bargaining stance, so that a
negotiator's principal could be convinced of the negotiator's toughness and
perhaps made amenable to more conciliatory moves. Similarly, the other
side could overinflate the value of some particular issue or concession,
bargain hard on it, and then finally concede, all in order to give the
negotiator a win she needs to help her convince her principal of her efforts
to bargain for it.
D. Constituencies on the Other Side
To this point, I have considered agency or representative
51. Negotiators "signal" by using language or demeanor that may give inconsistent
messages. Taken superficially, a message may indicate that the negotiator is not flexible.
The subtext of the message, however, is that the issue is in fact negotiable. For example,
suppose the negotiator says, "That's a pretty solid condition." Listening superficially, one
might conclude that the negotiator is talking about a "must have," but the language is
qualified. "Pretty solid" is not solid. An acute listener and experienced negotiator realizes
that the negotiator making the statement is indicating that the matter is actually negotiable.
Negotiators use signaling when they feel unfree to disclose openly what matters
are negotiable or whether there is more room to bargain on certain issues. This usually
occurs when there is an audience that the negotiator must impress, such as the negotiator's
principal.
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bargaining from the point of view of a negotiator representing others. In
most cases of representative bargaining, however, there will be a
represented party on each side of the bargaining. In the case of multiple
party bargaining, there may be many represented parties, individual
clients, or constituencies. Such bargaining situations can be complex. For
example, suppose a negotiator succeeds in gaining flexibility from the
constituency she represents and persuades it to permit her to engage in
problem-solving bargaining. The negotiator representing a constituency on
the other side may not agree, or not know how, to problem-solve.
Alternatively, the latter constituency could be factionalized in a way that
so constrains its negotiator that she must negotiate only for particular
positions or results and in particular ways.
Consequently, when a negotiator represents another party, she
must attend to factors other than the needs and possible politics of her own
client or constituency. To be effective in the negotiation, she must also
have a good sense of the pressures and problems that the other negotiator's
client or constituency imports into the actual negotiation. Moreover, she
will need to understand the other negotiator's relationship to his own
principal. Finally, she may even have to take actions that, while not
alienating her own principal, will assist the other negotiator in managing
his principal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Coalitions, as collective actors in many complex bargaining
situations, are fluid and dynamic alliances of parties having the aim of
securing gains through joint action. Coalitions complicate negotiations not
only by adding parties, but also by multiplying the negotiations taking
place. At the least, coalition bargaining involves a double negotiation
game: an internal and external negotiation. However, coalitions can
reconfigure in a multitude of ways as the bargaining situation changes and
as parties responsively renegotiate the terms of their alliance. Coalition
bargaining may entail many negotiations, as individual actors change
positions before the final accounting. In this sense, coalition action
mirrors political action and crosses any conceptual divide between
negotiation and politics.
Coalition action is an inescapable element of collective decision
making. Anyone who seeks to influence collective decision making or
attempts to help groups reach negotiated decisions, needs to understand the
interplays and possibilities of coalition dynamics. Further, much coalition
bargaining is agented bargaining. Introducing an agent into this scheme
brings new elements and dynamics into a negotiation. The facts and
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constraints of representation shape the agent's behavior and strategy both
at and away from the table. They also provide the agent with the
possibility of shaping, even manipulating, the party who placed her there.
When the party is a coalition, matters become complicated and raise
questions of who serves whom. A wise appreciation of these factors - of
coalition actions and actors - helps the focal negotiator to navigate and, if
necessary, manage coalitions.
